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Abstract 
 
Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth 
century. His influence, however, extends beyond philosophy. His account of Dasein, or human 
existence, permeates the human and social sciences, including nursing, psychiatry, psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, and artificial intelligence. In this chapter, I outline Heidegger’s 
influence on psychiatry and psychology, focusing especially on his relationships with the Swiss 
psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. The first section outlines Heidegger’s early 
life and work, up to and including the publication of Being and Time, in which he develops his 
famous concept of being-in-the-world. The second section focuses on Heidegger’s initial 
influence on psychiatry via Binswanger’s founding of Daseinsanalysis, a Heideggerian approach 
to psychopathology and psychotherapy. The third section turns to Heidegger’s relationship with 
Boss, including Heidegger’s rejection of Binswanger’s Daseinsanalysis and his lectures at Boss’s 
home in Zollikon, Switzerland. 
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“Martin Heidegger” 
Anthony Vincent Fernandez 
Introduction 
Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth 
century. His magnum opus, Being and Time, was a catalyst for French existentialism, 
philosophical hermeneutics, and even deconstruction and post-structuralism. Many of the central 
works of 20th-century continental philosophy—including Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, Simone de Beauvoir’s 
The Second Sex, and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method—are deeply indebted to 
Heidegger’s philosophical project. 
Today, Heidegger’s influence extends beyond philosophy. His account of Dasein,1 or 
human existence, permeates the human and social sciences, including nursing, psychiatry, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, and artificial intelligence. This broad influence owes much 
to his rich account of everyday life. Rather than start from a detached intellectual or scientific 
perspective, Heidegger starts from our “average everydayness.” He explores what it means to be 
human, which requires that he address everything from the nature of tool use to the challenges of 
maintaining a social identity to our inevitable confrontation with death.  
                                               
1 The German Dasein is often left untranslated in the English editions of Heidegger’s texts. The 
term translates simply to “being-there.” It serves as what Heidegger calls a “formal indication,” a 
way of pointing at the phenomenon one wants to study without our presuppositions leading us 
astray. In this case, Heidegger wants to avoid problematically framing his study with concepts 
like “human,” “person,” “subjectivity, “mind,” or “consciousness,” all of which come with 
extensive historical and conceptual baggage. Dasein allows him to point to what he wants to 
study—what it’s like for us to be-there—without determining the direction of his study in 
advance (Heidegger 2008 pp. 61–2; see also Burch 2013; O’Rourke 2018). 
 3 
In this chapter, I outline Heidegger’s influence on psychology and psychiatry, focusing 
especially on his relationships with the Swiss psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Medard 
Boss. The first section outlines Heidegger’s early life and work, up to and including the 
publication of Being and Time, in which he develops his famous concept of being-in-the-world. 
The second section focuses on Heidegger’s initial influence on psychiatry via Binswanger’s 
founding of Daseinsanalysis, a Heideggerian approach to psychopathology and psychotherapy. 
The third section turns to Heidegger’s relationship with Boss, including Heidegger’s rejection of 
Binswanger’s Daseinsanalysis and his lectures at Boss’s home in Zollikon, Switzerland. 
 
Heidegger’s Early Life and Work: 1889–1927 
Martin Heidegger was born in Messkirch, Germany, to Friedrich and Johanna Heidegger, and 
grew up with his younger brother, Fritz. Friedrich was a master cooper and sexton of the local 
Catholic church. Martin was therefore brought up in the Catholic tradition and his education, 
beginning from the age of 14, was supported by the church. This support was, however, both a 
blessing and a curse. The church financed educational opportunities far beyond his family’s 
means. But it provided these opportunities on the condition that he enter the priesthood. 
Therefore, when his faith waned, he found himself in a difficult position: Leave the church and 
forfeit the opportunity to continue his studies or remain faithful and limit himself to topics that 
the church will support? (Safranski 1999: Ch. 1) 
 Heidegger struggled with this dilemma for years. In 1909, he entered the novitiate with 
the intention of becoming a priest but was discharged two weeks later when he complained of 
heart trouble (Safranski 1999: 15). In 1911, while studying at seminary, he was again dismissed 
for heart trouble. At this time, it was determined that he did not have the physical constitution to 
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serve the church. After a period at home in Messkirch, Heidegger decided to end his studies of 
theology. He enrolled at the University of Freiburg in the winter semester 1911–12 to study 
mathematics, science, and philosophy. In the absence of the Catholic church’s financial support, 
he managed to raise enough funds with a loan, a small grant from the university, and private 
tutoring. In 1913, he received his doctorate under the supervision of Professor Arthur Schneider, 
Chair of Catholic Philosophy (Safranski 1999: 43). 
 Shortly after completing his doctorate, Heidegger began his habilitation. Despite no 
longer pursuing the priesthood, he was able to secure a grant from a Catholic institution to 
support three years of study. The following year, 1914, saw the outbreak of the First World War. 
Owing to his heart condition, Heidegger was able to defer military service and continue working 
on his habilitation, which he submitted in 1915. Later that year he was once again recruited for 
military service but he was hospitalized a few weeks later, then transferred to a postal 
supervision center where he censored letters sent to non-allied countries (Safranski 1999: 67). 
 In 1916, Heidegger met Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. Husserl, who 
had just moved from Göttingen to take up a chair at Freiburg, immediately acquired a close 
circle of acolytes and assistants, including Edith Stein and Heidegger himself. His 
phenomenology shared much in common with strands of neo-Kantianism active at the time, but 
it promised a radical new method for understanding human experience. The phenomenologist 
was said to be a perpetual beginner, bracketing out her previous beliefs and prejudices in order to 
attend not to the objects of experience but to way we experience, or to the experiencing itself. 
Heidegger, enamored with this new approach, quickly caught Husserl’s attention. Soon, Husserl 
treated Heidegger not only as an acolyte and assistant, but as a near equal. Even when Heidegger 
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was sent off for active military duty in 1918—joining the frontline meteorological service—the 
two remained in close correspondence (Safranski 1999: Ch. 5). 
 However, as Heidegger’s thinking developed, he merged his own scholastic and 
Aristotelian training with Husserl’s new method, developing a radically new approach to 
ontology. To appreciate the radical nature of Heidegger’s ontological project, we first need a 
general understanding of what ontology is, according to Heidegger. Most of our inquiries, 
including most of our scientific investigations, philosophical studies, and everyday questions, are 
ontic—they ask about concrete beings or entities. However, some of our philosophical questions 
are ontological, rather than ontic—they ask about what it means to be, rather than about concrete 
beings. We can clarify this distinction with a classic phenomenological example: a coffee mug. If 
I investigate a coffee mug ontically, there are a variety of questions that I might ask: What is it 
made of? How much liquid does it hold? Who made it? What is its monetary value? These are all 
questions about the coffee mug itself—questions about its concrete characteristics, history, value, 
and so on. But I can also study a coffee mug ontologically, in which case I would ask a different 
set of questions: What does it mean to be a coffee mug? What are the features that something 
must have in order to count as a coffee mug? What makes a coffee mug different from a teacup? 
This distinction between the ontic and the ontological is what Heidegger calls the “ontological 
difference” (see, e.g., Heidegger 1962: 83; 1988: 227–229; 2001: 116). This difference is key to 
his philosophical program and its proper interpretation was a major point of contention in 
psychological and psychiatric applications of his work. 
How, then, did Heidegger transform the field of ontology? One of Heidegger’s key 
insights is that ontology isn’t just a philosophical program. Ontology permeates everyday life. 
Every time I engage with an ontic being—such as a coffee mug, a writing desk, or my 
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colleague—I operate with a tacit sense of what it means to be this being. This doesn’t mean that I 
can list off necessary and sufficient criteria. Rather, I demonstrate my understanding through my 
successful engagement. I demonstrate that I understand what it means to be a coffee mug by 
pulling one out of the cabinet, filling it with coffee, and taking a sip as I sit down at my desk. 
This is what Heidegger calls a “pre-ontological” understanding. We may not operate with a well-
formulated ontological theory. But we always have a sense of what it means to be. 
This insight into the everydayness of ontology grounds Heidegger’s approach in his 1927 
magnum opus, Being and Time.2 Here, he argues that ontology must begin with an investigation 
of the being for whom “Being is an issue,” the being who asks the question of being in the first 
place: the human being (Heidegger 1962: 32). Who we take ourselves to be is always a project, a 
challenge, a process of becoming. Whether I consider myself to be a friend, a carpenter, an 
American, or a tourist, there are certain norms and obligations that I must fulfill. If I don’t 
conform to these norms, then I risk losing this possibility for being. In some cases, this loss is 
trivial. Today I’m a tourist; tomorrow I’m a professor. But, in many cases, the loss of who we 
take ourselves to be is traumatic. Whether the source of loss is a divorce, a layoff, a fight with a 
friend, or a political collapse, we lose the possibility for being who we were. In such cases, we 
realize that our being or identity is fundamentally tied to our social and environmental relations. 
We become who we are through our interactions with others and the way we take up what our 
environment offers us. This is why Heidegger says that Dasein, or human existence, is not an 
isolated subject or a Cartesian mental substance: Dasein is “being-in-the-world.” Human 
                                               
2 For an accessible introduction to Heidegger’s philosophy, see Richard Polt (1999). For a 
detailed account of the development of Being and Time, see Theodore Kisiel (1995). 
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existence is always embedded in a world, in a concrete history and community, and can only 
understand itself as such. 
Our being-in-the-world is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon but, as Heidegger 
argues, its essence is “care” (Sorge)—or what he sometimes refers to as “disclosedness” 
(Heidegger 1962: 235–41). Dasein is the being that discloses, or opens up, a world of sense and 
meaning. The coffee mug, for instance, never shows up to me as a brute object. It shows up as 
the gift that my mother gave me when I moved away for college or as the thing that I need to 
wash in the kitchen sink so that I can use it again in the morning. Everything that I experience 
has its sense and meaning within a web of relations, which are ultimately tied to both my cultural 
context and my particular aims and projects. 
Heidegger argues that a world is opened up, or disclosed, through “thrown projection.” 
We find ourselves already thrown into a world—we are constrained by our culture, language, 
class, religious upbringing, and even our previous life choices. But we also project 
possibilities—we might become a friend, a father, a carpenter, or a professor, or perhaps we’ll 
continue to be who we already are. The world we find ourselves thrown into both opens and 
constrains our potentialities-for-being, the range of possibilities that we can project. According to 
Heidegger, this tension of thrownness and projection discloses a meaningful world. 
The particular meaning that something has for me emerges from the tension between my 
concrete thrownness and the particular possibilities that I project for myself. In a classroom, for 
example, the whiteboard has a substantially different meaning for the students, the professor, and 
the custodian. How we engage with the whiteboard depends on who we take ourselves to be. For 
the students it is the thing to look at when taking notes. For the professor it is a way to 
supplement her lecture and illustrate her point. For the custodian it is an object to clean in 
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preparation for the next day of classes. But, of course, none of us are fixed in these roles or 
possibilities. The custodian might also be a student in that very classroom. And one of the 
students—perhaps working toward his PhD—might lecture to undergraduates in this classroom 
before attending his evening graduate seminar. Our identities are neither stable nor uniform. 
They are always in flux, and each possibility that we take up shifts how we experience and make 
sense of our world. 
But this interchangeability of our possibilities—the simple fact that you might take my 
place and I might take yours—suggests that they are not really our own. The possibilities we take 
up are simply given to us by our society and circumstances, and we fulfill them in the way 
anyone would fulfill them. If I take myself to be a professor, then this means that I teach, mentor 
students, attend conferences, and publish papers. If I fail to do some or all of these things, then I 
risk losing my possibility for being a professor—not only in the sense that I might lose my job, 
but in the sense that no one will recognize me as a professor. However, in my day-to-day life, 
who I take myself to be isn’t something that I reflect upon. I simply fulfill the social norms 
required for maintaining my possibilities without much thought. Heidegger calls this mode of 
existence “inauthentic” (uneigentlich) and he contrasts it with an “authentic” (eigentlich) mode 
of existence. By employing these terms, Heidegger isn’t necessarily disapproving of our 
everyday way of life. Rather, his primary aim is to distinguish two different modes of 
comportment. In an inauthentic comportment, we take up our possibilities without explicit 
reflection. But, in an authentic comportment, we actively choose our possibility for being—even 
if we simply choose the possibility that we find ourselves already thrown into. 
 These features of human life make up the core of Heidegger’s ontology of human 
existence. With the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger established himself as one of the 
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foremost philosophers of the twentieth century. But he probably hadn’t expected that it would 
inspire generations of psychiatrists, providing a foundation for a new approach to 
psychopathology and psychotherapy.   
 
Heidegger’s First Contact with Psychiatry: 1928–1947 
While Heidegger had a longstanding relationship with the philosopher and psychiatrist, Karl 
Jaspers, it was Ludwig Binswanger who first saw the importance of Heidegger’s work for 
psychopathology and psychotherapy. Heidegger and Binswanger met in 1929 following a brief 
correspondence regarding the celebration of Husserl’s seventieth birthday (Frie 1999: 246). 
Binswanger—a student of Eugen Bleuler and Carl Jung, and a close friend of Sigmund Freud—
was steeped in the psychoanalytic tradition. However, unsatisfied with the philosophical 
foundations of psychoanalysis, he found in Heidegger’s Being and Time a promising new way of 
thinking about human existence. 
 Binswanger established a psychiatric approach that he called “Daseinsanalysis” 
(Daseinsanalyse)3. On this approach, mental illness is not the product of innate drives or an 
inherent tension between id, ego, and superego, but a pathological way of projecting one’s 
possibilities for being. Binswanger found that many of his patients operated with a profoundly 
limited capacity for self- and world-interpretation, often as the result of traumatic life events. 
When confronted with especially distressing events, they resorted to a narrow repertoire of 
interpretive concepts to make sense of themselves and their situations, resulting in a pathological 
                                               
3 The German Daseinsanalyse is translated either as “Daseinsanalysis”—maintaining the 
tradition of not translating “Dasein”—or as “existential analysis.” While the latter translation is 
less awkward, it risks confusing Binswanger’s approach with other existential approaches to 
psychology and psychiatry, such as Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis (Sartre 1993). 
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rather than a healthy response. To restore the mental health of his patients, Binswanger helped 
them broaden their scope of possibilities for being (see, e.g., Binswanger 1958). 
Initially, Binswanger clearly distinguished his own aims from those of Heidegger. He 
characterized his project as an ontic application of Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein. In other 
words, Heidegger’s ontological account of human existence provided a framework for 
Binswanger’s ontic studies of particular human pathologies. Over time, however, Binswanger 
became more critical of Heidegger’s approach. He argued that Heidegger mischaracterized the 
social dimension of human existence and, therefore, failed to understand the nature of the face-
to-face, I-Thou relationship, which is key to effective psychotherapy (Binswanger 1993; see also 
Frie 1999: 249). 
Binswanger’s goal was to help his patients achieve an authentic existence. But, on 
Heidegger’s account, authenticity seems to be something one achieves alone. As Roger Frie says, 
“Binswanger argues that for Heidegger, authentic existence is a private world, structured by 
Dasein’s concern for its own Being; Dasein as care achieves its authenticity in essential isolation 
from others” (Frie 1999: 249). In light of Heidegger’s allegedly solipsistic characterization, 
Binswanger sought to revise both our understanding of what authenticity is and how it’s 
achieved. He argues that genuine authenticity emerges from a relationship of dialogue, openness, 
and mutual engagement—and, moreover, this relationship must be founded on love, not care. 
Only through a fundamental attunement of love can the therapist help her patient achieve 
authenticity (Frie 1999: 248).  
 Throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s, Binswanger established his new approach to 
psychotherapy, helping patients overcome their limited possibilities for being and achieve 
genuine authenticity. During this time, Heidegger underwent a crisis of possibilities in his own 
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life. Because he had joined the Nazi party and served, briefly, as rector of the University of 
Freiburg in the early 1930s, he faced denazification proceedings after the Second World War.4 
Based largely on Jaspers’ expert opinion, he was barred from teaching for four years (Safranski 
1999: 339). Heidegger, suddenly stripped of his possibility for being a professor, experienced a 
mental breakdown. He entered a sanitorium in Badenweiler where he was treated by Victor 
Baron von Gebsattel, a psychiatrist working in Binswanger’s now influential school of 
Daseinsanalysis (Safranski 1999: 351). The following year, 1947, Heidegger read Binswanger’s 
Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (Basic Forms and Knowledge of Human 
Existence), which he had received from Binswanger in 1944 (Frie 1999: 250). Upon reading the 
book, he wrote a supportive and encouraging letter to Binswanger, who had been anxiously 
awaiting Heidegger’s assessment. 
 
Heidegger, Boss, and the Zollikon Seminars: 1947–1976 
That same year, Heidegger received a letter from another psychiatrist, Medard Boss, who 
read Being and Time while serving as a battalion doctor in the Swiss army during the war. The 
two met shortly after and, over the next three decades, developed a close friendship. But 
Heidegger’s relationship with Boss cast a dark shadow over Binswanger and his Daseinsanalytic 
project. Despite his initial enthusiasm for Binswanger’s work, he found in Boss a more 
                                               
4 For a time, there was considerable debate over the nature of Heidegger’s anti-Semitic views and 
his service to the Nazi party. It was well known that he referred to the “inner truth and greatness” 
of National Socialism, but later criticized the movement for its attempt to mobilize the German 
people into an organized machine, a mere resource for military domination—what Heidegger 
refers to as “standing reserves” (Heidegger 1993). However, in light of the publication of 
Heidegger’s Black Notebooks, his anti-Semitic sentiments are undeniable (see Cesare 2018). 
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formidable representative of his project, eventually rescinding his approval of Binswanger’s 
work altogether. 
The friendship between Heidegger and Boss culminated in a series of seminars held at the 
University of Zurich Psychiatric Clinic and at Boss’s home in Zollikon, Switzerland, from 1959 
to 1969 (K. Aho 2018a). Heidegger lectured to a group of psychiatrists on ontology, 
hermeneutics, the nature of embodiment, time and temporality, and—of course—a Heideggerian 
approach to psychiatric research and practice. In light of the wide-ranging nature of Heidegger’s 
lectures, I focus here on two of his contributions to psychology and psychiatry: his 
characterization of the relationship between Daseinsanalysis and ontology, as clarified through 
his critique of Binswanger, and his general theory of health and illness, developed in 
collaboration with Boss.  
While Heidegger was enthusiastic about the application of his work in psychology and 
psychiatry, he did have some reservations about the way in which his insights were being 
applied. In particular, he was concerned that some of these applications involved a 
misunderstanding of the ontological difference—and he attributed the source of this 
misunderstanding to Binswanger. To illustrate the misunderstanding, Heidegger returned to 
Binswanger’s critique, in which he argued that Heidegger’s ontology—which established care as 
the being, or essence, of Dasein—left no space for love, which is essential to the therapeutic 
relationship that leads one out of illness and into an authenticity. Heidegger claimed that this 
critique is not only unwarranted, but is grounded in a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
ontological difference: 
Binswanger’s misunderstanding consists not so much of the fact that he wants to 
supplement “care” with love, but that he does not see that care has an existential, that is, 
ontological sense. Therefore, the analytic of Da-sein asks for Dasein’s basic ontological 
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(existential) constitution [Verfassung] and does not wish to give a mere description of the 
ontic phenomena of Dasein. (Heidegger 2001: 116) 
 
As Heidegger characterizes it, care refers to our basic openness to the world, our basic capacity 
to find the world meaningfully articulated. It is therefore an ontological structure of Dasein, an 
essential structure that grounds all particular modes of existence. Love, on the other hand, is one 
of these particular, ontic modes—like joy, boredom, anxiety, and so on. Love is just one of the 
many ways in which we might relate to others. Properly understood, Heidegger’s notion of care 
leaves ample room for love, even if Heidegger never produced a study of love himself. 
Despite Binswanger admitting his “productive misunderstanding” in the wake of this 
critique, Heidegger suggested that Binswanger’s misunderstanding permeated his entire project 
and, therefore, undermined its legitimacy. He claimed that if Daseinsanalysis is to be 
successfully employed, it must respect the ontological difference: Daseinsanalysis is merely an 
ontic application of the ontological analysis of human existence—the insights of Daseinsanalysis 
cannot, therefore, challenge the insights of Heidegger’s own ontology.5 
This brings us to the second element of Heidegger’s contribution to psychology and 
psychiatry: his theory of health and illness. If pathology does not touch the ontological 
constitution of Dasein, but only its ontic ways of being, then how should we understand the 
nature of health and illness? Heidegger argues that illness should be understood as a specific 
kind of negation, which he calls “privation.” To say that the ill person is “deprived of health” 
                                               
5 I’ve argued elsewhere that Binswanger’s confused understanding of the ontological difference 
actually provides a more accurate depiction of both human existence and mental illness. 
Heidegger denied that mental illness could involve alterations of the ontological structure of 
human existence. However, in some cases, appealing to alterations in the ontological structure 
itself provides a more illuminating, and accurate, account of the condition in question (Fernandez 
2018). 
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implies that health is his proper mode of being—that it, in some sense, belongs to him. As 
Heidegger says, 
It is a remarkable fact that your whole medical profession moves within a 
negation in the sense of a privation. You deal with illness. The doctor asks someone who 
comes to him, “What is wrong with you?” The sick person is not healthy. This being-
healthy, this being-well, this finding oneself well is not simply absent but is disturbed. 
Illness is a phenomenon of privation. Each privation implies the essential belonging to 
something that is lacking, which is in need of something. (Heidegger 2001: 46) 
 
According to Heidegger, illness is not simply the privation of some natural biological function. It 
is the privation of possibilities: “Each illness is a loss of freedom, a constriction of the possibility 
for living” (Heidegger 2001: 175). In this respect, illness is what Heidegger calls a “deficient 
mode” of existence. This concept, employed throughout Being and Time, refers to any instance 
in which one is not open to the full or genuine range of possibilities. It is a particular, ontic way 
of being open to the world—a way of being open that, nevertheless, constrains the possibilities 
that one is open to. 
 This is the foundation upon which Boss constructed his new Daseinsanalytic approach.6 
While he investigated the nuances of various mental illnesses, he construed each illness as a 
reduction of one’s freedom for possibilities. The therapist’s goal is, therefore, to help her patient 
maximize his openness toward possibilities for being (Kouba 2015: 104). Boss went so far as to 
argue—in Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology—that this characterization of 
illness applies not only to mental illness, but to somatic illness as well. Building upon his earlier 
work on psychosomatic conditions, he characterized all forms of illness as an impairment of our 
potentialities and freedom for possibilities (Boss 1979: 199–200). Therefore, while Heidegger’s 
                                               
6 To distinguish Binswanger’s and Boss’s approaches, they are sometimes referred to as 
“psychiatric Daseinsanalysis” and “therapeutic Daseinsanalysis,” respectively (see, e.g., Kouba 
2015). 
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influence on conceptions of health and illness began with psychiatric conditions, it eventually 
extended to the full range of illness. 
 
Conclusion: Heidegger’s Influence Today 
Today, Heidegger’s work influences not only the philosophical and theoretical literature on 
health and illness, but medical research and practice itself—especially approaches to psychiatry 
and nursing. One of the most direct applications is found in the phenomenology of depressive 
disorders, in which Heidegger’s theory of mood and attunement is used to articulate the affective 
disturbance characteristic of depressive episodes (K. Aho 2013; Fernandez 2014a, 2014b; 
Ratcliffe 2015; Svenaeus, 2007). But his account of human existence provides a foundation for 
understanding a broad range of conditions—from acute, life-threating illness to chronic 
disabilities (Abrams 2016; J. Aho & K. Aho 2009; K. Aho 2018b; Carel 2016; Svenaeus 2000). 
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